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CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE BENEFIT OF ADDING MORE FORMALITIES TO THE MANUAL FORCOURTS-MARTIAL RULE-MAKING PROCESS:A RESPONSE TO CAPTAIN KEVIN J. BARRY Captain Gregory E. Maggs*Opinions and conclusions in articles published in the Military LawReview are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarilyreflect the views of the Judge Advocate General, the Department ofthe Army, or any other government agency.
I. Introduction In Modernizing the Manual for Courts-Martial Rule-Making Process:A Work in Progress,1  Captain Kevin J. Barry, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired),describes the great and steady progress that has occurred in the *2 methodsfor adopting changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).2  As hisarticle demonstrates, 3 the amendment process has become much more open
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES2
4 See id. at 249 (citing Department of Defense Policy Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 3401(Jan. 25, 1982)). 5 See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 15 ,823  (Apr. 13, 1982). 6 See Barry, supra  note 2 , at 252 . 7 See id. 8 See id. at 252-53. 9 Id. at 259 (quoting DOD DIRECTIVE 5500.17, RO LE AND RESPONSIBILI-TIES OF THE JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE (JSC)at encl. 2, E2.4.6 (May 8, 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafterDOD DIRECTIVE 5500.17]). 
and responsive to outside views than in decades past. Significant improve-ments noted by Captain Barry include the following:   • Since 1982, the Department of Defense (DOD) has had a policy ofpublishing notice of amendments to the MCM in the Federal Registerand waiting seventy-five days for public comment before submittingthem to the President for promulgation by executive order.4    • Also since 1982, the notice printed in the Federal Register hasincluded not only a summary of proposed amendments, but alsoinformation about where and how to obtain their full text.5    • Since 1993, the Federal Register has included the full text ofnon-binding commentary to be published with new MCM provisionsin the familiar “Discussion” and “Analysis” sections.6     • Also since 1993, the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice(JSC), which has responsibility for preparing MCM rule changes forthe President’s issuance, has held public meetings for the purpose ofreceiving comments during the seventy-five day waiting period.7     • Since 1994, the JSC has published full-text notice of proposedchanges to the MCM and new commentary prior to the publicmeeting and prior to their approval as amendments to be submittedto the President.8  • Since 1996, a DOD Directive has obliged the JSC to “consider all viewspresented at the public meeting and written comments*3 submittedduring the seventy-five day period in determining the final form of anyproposed amendments.”9  • Starting in 2000, the JSC will send annual calls for proposals to thejudiciary, trial, and defense organizations, the Judge Advocate General
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10 See id. at 262. 11 On 28 January 1997, charges of disobedience of a “no contact” order, falsestatements, fraternization, and adultery were preferred against Lieutenant Flinn. TheAssistant Secretary of the Air Force approved her resignation in lieu of trial with acharacterization of general under honorable conditions. See Tony Capaccio, PilotErrors , AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct., 1997, at 18 (summarizing the entire KellyFlinn incident). 12 From November 1996 to April 1998, forty-nine male cadre members and drillsergeants were investigated for sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving Ground(APG). Five APG drill sergeants and a training unit company commander were triedby court-martial. One former APG drill sergeant was found not guilty formisconduct while an APG drill sergeant. Captain Derrick Robertson was sentencedto confinement for three years, total forfeiture of a ll pay and allowances, anddismissal from the service. His pretrial agreement limited confinement to twelvemonths with eight months suspended. Staff Sergeant Delmar Simpson wassentenced to confinement for twenty-five years, total forfeitures, reduction toPrivate E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. Staff Sergeant Vernell Robinson Jr. wassentenced to confinement for six months, total forfeitures, and  a dishonorabledischarge. Staff Sergeant Wayne Gamble was sentenced to confinement for tenmonths, total forfeitures, reduction to E1, and a dishonorable discharge. StaffSergeant Herman Gunter was sentenced to reduction from staff sergeant tospecialist, and a reprimand. Staff Sergeant Marvin C. Kelley was sentenced toreduction from staff sergeant to private E-1, to be confined for ten months, and tobe discharged from the service with a dishonorable discharge. See Tom Curley &Steven Komarow, For Army, the Focus Now Turns to Remaining Cases, USATO DAY, Apr. 1997 (summarizing charges and verdicts). 13 On 16 March 1999, Command Sergeant M ajor Gene C. McKinney, the formerSergeant Major of the Army was convicted, contrary to his pleas, by a courtcomposed of officer and enlisted members of one specification of obstruction ofjustice in  violation of UCMJ Article 134. He was sentenced to reduction to MasterSergeant. He was acquitted of four specifications of maltreatment of subordinates,one specification of simple assault, four specifications of wrongful solicitation tocommit adultery, one specification of adultery, one specification of obstruction ofjustice, two specifications of communication of a threat, four specifications ofindecent assault, and one specification of assault on a superior commissionedofficer. The findings and sentence were approved by the general court-martial
schools, and elsewhere. It also will publish an invitation in the FederalRegister for the public to submit proposals.10Although Captain Barry acknowledges the significance of the changesin the JSC process over the years, he believes that much room for progressstill remains. He suggests that the recent high profile sexual misconductcases relating to Lieutenant Kelly Flinn,11 the drill sergeants at AberdeenProving Ground,12  Sergeant Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney, 13 and
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convening authority on 28 August 1998. See McKinney v. Ivany, 48 M.J. 908(Army Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (providing these and other details); ABC News, Inc.v. Powell, 47  M.J. 363 (1997) (same). 14 On 17 March 1998, M ajor General David R .E. Hale was found guilty inaccordance with his pleas of seven specifications of conduct unbecoming an officerand one specification of making a false  official statement. Major General Hale hadimproper relationships with the spouses of four subordinates and then lied about itto his superiors. Major General Hale was sentenced by a military judge to receivea reprimand, forfeiture of $1500 pay per month for twelve months and a $10,000fine. In accordance with the terms of a pretrial agreement, the general court-martialconvening authority reduced the forfeitures to $1000 pay per month for twelvemonths, and approved the remainder of the adjudged sentence. See Harry G.Summers, Defining Deviancy Down in the Army,  WASH. TIMESS, Mar. 23, 1999,at A19. He was subsequently retired at the direction of the Secretary of the Armyin the grade of Brigadier General. See Army Secretary  Takes Back Star fromRetired General; Demoted  Officer Convicted of Affairs with  Wives of FourSubordinates, BALT. SUN, Sept. 3, 1999, at 4A. 15 Barry, supra  note 2 , at 239 . 16 Id. at 240. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. Captain Barry’s assertion that the process for amending the MCM  hasreceived little public attention appears correct. The Office of The Judge AdvocateGeneral (OTJAG), Criminal Law Division (CLD), is responsible for answeringmost questions from the public about the Army cases in the military justice systemthat are directed to the President, Congress, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staffof the Army, and The Judge Advocate General. Colonel Mark Harvey, DeputyChief, OTJAG -CLD , indicated that approximately 1500 letters were received fromthe public from 1996-2000 . Aside from correspondence from the StandingCommittee on Armed Forces Law, the National Institute of Military Justice, andlawyers affiliated with these organizations, no correspondence requesting morepublic participation in the JSC was received. Out of hundreds of newspaper articlesrelating to the Aberdeen Proving Ground cases, and the courts-martial of SergeantMajor of the Army Gene C. McKinney and Major General David R.E. Hale, noneexpressed concern about the JSC process. Interview with Colonel M ark W . Harvey,Deputy Chief, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Criminal Law Division, inArlington, Va. (21 July 2000) [hereinafter Harvey Interview]. 
Major General David Hale14  have “raised questions about whether themilitary trial process is fair.”15  Captain Barry believes that one “cruciallyimportant issue”16  that “bears decidedly on ... perceptions of fairness” ofthe military justice system,17  but which has “received considerably lessattention” than other issues,18  is “the method by which *4 amendments tothe Manual for Court-Martial ... are proposed, considered, and adopted.”19
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20 See Barry, supra  note 2 , at 264-76. 21 Id. at 264. 22 See id. at 264-69. 23 American Bar Association, Summary of Action of the House of Delegates,1997 Midyear Meeting, San Antonio, Texas 2 (1997) [hereinafter ABA Summary].24 See Kenneth J.  Hodson, Military Justice: Abolish or Change, 22 KAN. L.REV. 31 (1973). 25 Id. at 53. 26 See infra Part III.D. 
Accordingly, in Part IV of his article,20  Captain Barry advances various“Recommendations for the Future”21  for improving*5 the method ofcreating and amending the procedural and evidentiary rules for courts-mar-tial. Although Captain Barry does not enumerate them, he puts forth a totalof seven specific proposals. Three recommendations are based on aresolution of the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates.22In 1997, at the recommendation of the ABA’s Standing Committee onArmed Forces Law (SCAFL), the ABA House of Delegates approved thefollowing resolution: RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends thatfederal law be amended to model court-martial rule-making procedures onthose procedures used in proposing and amending other Federal court rulesof practice, procedure, and evidence by establishing: ( 1 )  a  b r o a d l yconstituted advisory committee, including public membership andincluding representatives of the bar, the judiciary, and legal scholars, toconsider and recommend rules of procedure and evidence at courts-martial;(2) a method of adopting rules of procedure and evidence at courts-mar-tial which is generally consistent with court rule-making procedure inFederal civilian courts; (3) requirements for reporting to Congress [and]a waiting period for rules of procedure and evidence at courts-martial.23The fourth proposal is derived from a 1973 law review article by MajorGeneral Kenneth Hodson.24  In the article, General Hodson urged that “aMilitary Judicial Conference, headed by the Chief Judge of the Court ofMilitary Appeals, be established and given power to prescribe rules ofprocedure and evidence.”25  As described more fully below,26  this proposalrelates closely to the ABA’s second recommendation because the *6Judicial Conference headed by the Supreme Court leads the courtrule-making procedure in civilian courts. 
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27 Barry, supra  note 2 , at 275 . 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 See id. at 237 n.1. 31 See id. 32 See infra Part II. 
The final three recommendations for the future come from CaptainBarry himself. First, Captain Barry urges creating an enforceable “mecha-nism to make available to the public the contents and justifications for ...proposals ... generated within the DOD.”27  Second, Captain Barryrecommends making available to the public “the minutes of the meetingsof JSC (and of its working group) and the decisions on proposals generatedwithin the JSC and the DOD.”28  Third, Captain Barry advocates expandingthe membership of the JSC beyond “the five officers chiefly responsible forthe administration of military justice in the five services.” 29When Captain Barry addresses the subject of military justice, histhoughts warrant attention and reflection because of his long and distin-guished experience in the field. During his twenty-five years on active dutyin the Coast Guard, Captain Barry served in a variety of importantpositions, including Chief Trial Judge, appellate military judge, and chiefof the Coast Guard’s Legislative Division.30  Since retiring from activeservice, Captain Barry has developed an extensive private practice inmilitary and veterans law. He also has played key roles in leading militarylaw professional organizations, including the National Institute of MilitaryJustice, the Judge Advocates Association, and the ABA’s SCAFL.31  TheSCAFL’s views are similarly influential because of the vast military andlegal experience of its membership, including dozens of retired judgeadvocates, some of whom are retired general officers. The specificendorsement of most of the proposals by the ABA and by the legendaryMajor General Hodson, needless to say, makes Captain Barry’s ideas evenmore worthy of study. This article addresses Captain Barry’s proposals. Part II, begins bydiscussing three preliminary considerations concerning the MCM rule-mak-ing procedure.32  First, recent history suggests that the MCM probably willundergo only incremental changes for the foreseeable future. Second, theprocess of amending the MCM is largely irrelevant to most of the majormilitary justice reforms now being urged. Third, changes to the MCM *7rule-making process would affect the present balance of powers betweenCongress and the President, possibly producing unintended adverseconsequences. 
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33 See infra Part III. 34 See infra Part IV. 35 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U NIT ED STATES (1951); seealso COLONEL CHARLES L. DECKER, DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGAL ANDLEGISLATIVE BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES1951, The Army Library, Washington D.C. (1951) (discussing the history,preparation, and processing of the 1951 MCM ). 
Part III then responds to each of Captain Barry’s seven recommenda-tions. 33  On the whole, none of the proposals is radical or dangerous.Indeed, each is closely analogous to the federal civilian criminal justicesystem. In addition, no insurmountable legal obstacles would prevent theiradoption. Yet, closer inspection suggests that, in light of all the progressthat already has occurred in the methods for amending the MCM, none ofthe proposals would yield significant new benefits. At the same time, allbut one or two of the proposals would impose at least some significantburdens or costs. For these reasons, at least at present, the JSC, the DOD,the President, and Congress should view Captain Barry’s recommendationswith cautious skepticism.34 II. Preliminary Considerations Before assessing the desirability of adding new procedures andformalities to the MCM rule-making process, three preliminary consider-ations require attention: (1) the nature of future amendments to the MCMor, put another way, what the MCM rule-making process likely will be usedfor; (2) the kinds of reforms now being sought for the military justicesystem; and (3) the effect changes to the MCM rule-making process mighthave on the balance of powers between the President and Congress. Thefollowing discussion addresses these three considerations. A. Changes to the MCM that Will Occur in the Future What kind of changes to the MCM will occur in the future? The natureof the changes certainly matters a great deal to the process. If onlyadjustments to individual rules of evidence and procedure are likely tohappen, rather than sweeping systemic changes, then the need for anextensive revision of the MCM rule-making process seems less important.The *8 final results probably will not vary much no matter how amend-ments are processed before the President approves them. The MCM, to be sure, has seen dramatic changes in the past fifty years.In 1951, the President promulgated a new version of the MCM,35  designed
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36 Congress enacted the UCMJ on 5  May 1950, but delayed its effective dateuntil 31 May 1951. See Act of May 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 108 (codified as amended at10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946); see also INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORYUNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (1950) (setting forth the extensivelegislative history, hearings, reports, and floor debates prior to passage of theUniform Code of Military Justice). 37 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U NIT ED STATES (1969); seealso U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-2, ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS OFMANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 1969, REVISEDEDITION (July 1970) (containing a paragraph by paragraph analysis of the changesmade in the 1969 MCM ). 38 See Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1334 (1968). This act, whichbecame effective in 1969, among o ther things established the present role of themilitary judge in courts-martial. See John S. Cooke, Military Justice and theUniform Code of Military Justice, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2000, at 3 (discussing thishistory). 39 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES OFEVIDENCE M ANUAL (3d  ed. 1991). 40 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL.,  FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-DENCE M ANUAL 4 (7 th ed. 1998). 41 Exec. Order No. 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (Apr. 23, 1984); Exec. OrderNo. 12,484, 49 Fed. Reg. 28,825  (July 13 , 1984). 
to conform to the newly enacted UCMJ.36  The President approved asignificantly revised version of the MCM in 1969,37  taking into account theextensive changes in military law wrought by the Military Justice Act of1968.38  In 1980, the President codified the Military Rules of Evidence,39largely following the codification of the civilian Federal Rules of Evidencein 1975. 40 The last major revision occurred in 1984. In that year, thePresident adopted the codified Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.),41  andmade substantial changes to address revisions in the UCMJ caused by the
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42 See Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983);John S. Cooke, Highlights of the Military Justice Act of 1983, ARMY LAW ., Feb.1984, at 4. The Military Justice Act of 1983 directed the Secretary of Defense toestablish a commission to study and make recommendations to Congress regardingthe following issues: 1. Whether the sentencing authority in court-martial cases should be exercisedby a military judge in all non-capital cases to which a military judge has beendetailed; 2. Whether military judges and the Courts of Military Review should have thepower to suspend sentences; 3. Whether the jurisdiction of the special court-martial should be expanded topermit adjudgment of sentences including confinement of up to one year, and what,if any, changes should be made to current appellate jurisdiction; 4. Whether military judges, including those presiding at special and generalcourts-martial and those sitting on the Courts of Military Review, should havetenure; 5. What should be the elements of a fair and equitable retirement system for thejudges of the United States Court of M ilitary Appeals. The resulting Military Justice Act of 1983 Advisory Commission was composedof six military and three civilian members. Over a one-year period, the Commissionheard testimony from twenty-seven witnesses, including civilian experts, andreceived public comment from sources including retired  military leaders, publicinterest groups, bar associations and experts in military justice and criminal law.The Commission’s charter and notice of hearings was published in the FederalRegister. See THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 1983 ADVISORY COMMIS-SION REPORT (1984) [hereinafter 1983  REPORT]. 
Military Justice Act of 1983.42  These major revisions undoubtedly had adramatic effect on the substance and practice of military law. The nature of MCM amendments, however, has changed since 1984.The President has amended the MCM regularly, but as military jurispru-dence has become more similar to civilian criminal procedure (except in *9the area of sentencing), sweeping revisions appear to have becomesomething of the past. Most of the recent amendments to the MCM havestrived to serve one of three limited purposes. These amendments eithercorrect errors or oversights in existing rules, conform the rules of procedureand evidence to legislative changes to the UCMJ, or bring military law intoalignment with civilian criminal law. They have not attempted bold reformsthat effect the overall structure of the MCM. 
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES10
43 See Exec. Order No. 13 ,140 , 64 Fed. Reg. 55 ,115  (Oct. 6, 1999). 44 Id. 45 See Martin Sitler, Explanation of the 1999 Amendments to the Manual forCourts-Martial, ARMY LAW ., Nov. 1999, at 27. 46 See id. at 28. 47 See id. at 29. 48 See id. 49 Changes proposed by the JSC in 1998 and 2000 will conform the MCM  tolegislative amendments to the UCM J concerning Article 56a (Sentence toConfinement Without Eligibility for Parole) and Article 19 (Jurisdiction of SpecialCourts-Martial). See 65 Fed. Reg. 39,883 (June 28, 2000); 63 Fed. Reg. 25,835(May 11, 1998). 50 The military appellate courts and Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces haveauthored more than 100 volumes over the last fifty years of military justice caselaw,providing a significant body of law filling in the details and providing a judicialexplanation for the UCMJ and MCM . 51 During the past three years alone, the total number of general and specialcourts-martial in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard have fallen from5259 to 4397, fo r  a total decrease of 16% Compare  Annual Reports on MilitaryJustice for the Period October 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999 secs. 3-6, availableat http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY97/FY97Rept.htm (last visited 4 Aug.2000) (same). The long-term decreasing trend  is even more dramatic in the Army.See Lawrence J. Morris, Our Mission, No Future: The Case  for Closing the UnitedStates Army Disciplinary  Barracks, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 88 (1996)
The 1999 amendments to the MCM provide good illustrations of theincremental character of recent changes. 43 The first section of the Presi-dent’s executive orders alters six procedural rules. These alterations correctoversights and vestiges from past laws. For example, the first changedeletes the words “active duty” from the qualifications for military judgesin R.C.M. 507(c).44  This revision allows Reserve Component judges toconduct trials during inactive duty training and travel.45  The revisions also*10 bring military law into accordance with recent developments in civiliancriminal procedure. For instance, the amendments create special rules fortestimony by children in child abuse and domestic violence cases,46  andrecognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.47  Additional changes makeadjustments to existing rules. For instance, the changes expand theevidence admissible at sentencing, identify a new aggravating factor incapital cases, and define an offense of reckless endangerment under UCMJArticle 134.48  Other recent proposals have similarly limited scopes.49 The near future probably holds more of the same. The military justicesystem has matured during the fifty years since passage of the UCMJ.50The number of courts-martial held annually has declined dramatically. 51
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(noting that the number of general and special courts-martial in the Army has fallenfrom 6803 in 1980 to  1178 in 1995). 52 This article does not suggest that the MCM  rule-making procedures werenecessarily inadequate in the past. Historically, major changes to the MCMgenerally have occurred in response to amendments to the UCMJ by Congress. Inthis context, greater public participation in the MCM  rule-making process wouldhave provided  the President only limited benefits. The President had little discretionin conforming the MCM  to the UCMJ revisions. Congress, moreover, typically hasreceived significant public input before amending the UCM J. As Captain Barrycarefully describes, “[i]n the early years of the UCMJ, there was significant civilianinterest in the military justice system, and there was notable input by civilian groupsinto the legislative process affecting statutory changes to military justice. However,there seems to be no evidence of a similar interest or participation in the rule-mak-ing process.” Barry, supra  note 2, at 244. It also bears noting that the President andthe DOD have never shut out the public; although organizations and individualswith an interest in the military justice process sometimes have not availedthemselves of the opportunity, they have always been free to communicate with thePresident and military officials regarding military justice matters. 
Most importantly, the MCM now has a modern, codified structure likely toendure for the long term. Consequently, most new changes to the MCM arelikely to correct problems affecting a few cases, or to adapt the rules ofevidence and procedure so that they conform to incremental amendmentsto the UCMJ by Congress or developments occurring outside the armedforces. In the military, leaders always must look forward and must avoid themistake-as the quip goes-of preparing to fight the last war, instead of thenext. Accordingly, in assessing the procedures for amending the MCM, thequestion should not be whether the current procedures could have handledmassive revisions of the kinds seen in 1951, 1969, 1980, or 1984.52  *11Rather, the question is whether the current procedures-which are now farmore open-will satisfy the needs of the present and future, during whichtimes the MCM likely will face annual revisions that add or adjust only afew rules at a time. B. Limitations of Changes to the Rule-Making Process Captain Barry and other proponents of reforming the MCM rule-makingprocess surely do not view changing the process as an end in itself. On thecontrary, they presumably see their reform proposals as the means to anend. They must believe that a better rule-making process will facilitateadoption of better rules, producing an improved military justice system. 
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53 See Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An IndependentMilitary Judiciary-A Proposal to Amend  the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 629, 629-30 (1994). The civilian judges of the Courtof Appeals for the Armed Forces serve for terms of fifteen years. See 10 U .S.C. §142(b) (2000). In 1999, the  Secretary of the Army approved limited tenure forArmy judges. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE,paras. 8-1 g and 13-12 (1999) (providing tenure for Army trial and appellate judgesfor a minimum of three years with limited exceptions). 54 See Lederer & Hundley, supra  note 54, at 629-30. 55 See Hodson, supra  note 25, at 53; Lederer & Hundley, supra  note 54, at668-73; Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P . Tomes, Courts-Martial:  Time to Play Taps,28 SW. U. L. REV. 481, 531-33 (1999); Andrew M. Ferris, Comment, MilitaryJustice: Removing the Probability of Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 488-92;Karen A. Ruzic, Note, Military Justice and the Supreme Court’s OutdatedStandard  of Deference: Weiss v. United States, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.. 265,284-89 (1994). 56 At the request of Congress, the Military Justice Act of 1983 AdvisoryCommission considered this issue and recommended against providing tenure tomilitary trial and appellate judges. See 1983 REPORT, supra  note 43, at 8-9. In
Accordingly, in assessing the need for reforming the MCM rule-makingprocedures, two questions arise: (1) What kinds of changes to the militaryjustice system do reformers want to make?; and (2) Will altering the MCMrule-making procedures bring about those changes? For decades, commentators repeatedly have raised a familiar set ofconcerns about the military justice system. Presumably, many of theadvocates who want to reform the MCM rule-making process hope that newprocedures will overcome long-standing Department of Defense resistanceto changing the system to address these concerns. They also may expect anew process to help them deal with other serious problems in the future. For example, one recurring criticism of the military justice system,articulated mostly by attorneys rather than the general public, concerns the*12 independence of the military judiciary. Under the UCMJ and MCM,trial and appellate judges have no tenure of office.53  In theory, if thesejudges render unpopular decisions, the Judge Advocate General for theservice concerned could reassign them to non-judicial duties.54 Althoughtenure of office does not necessarily immunize judges from outsidepressure (as elected and appointed civilian judges have experienced), somecommentators have argued that giving military judges fixed terms wouldmake them more independent.55  To date, however, neither Congress nor theSupreme Court has required the services to give their judges tenure ofoffice.56 
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Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 181 (1994), the Supreme Court held that theaccused failed to demonstrate that the factors favoring a fixed term of office“overcome the balance struck by Congress.” The court gave the following threereasons for its decision: (1) [A]lthough a fixed term of office is a traditional component of theAnglo-American civilian judicial system, a fixed term of office has neverbeen a part of the military justice tradition, given that courts-martial havebeen conducted in the United States for more than 200 years without thepresence of a tenured judge and for more than 150 years without thepresence of any judge at all; (2) while this does not mean that any practicein military courts which might have been accepted at some time in historyautomatically satisfies due process, the historical fact that military judgeshave never had tenure is a factor which must be weighed; and (3) applicableUCMJ provisions and corresponding regulations, by insulating militaryjudges from the effects of command influence, sufficiently preserve judicialimpartiality .... Id. 57 See 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (2000) (“When convening a court-martial, theconvening authority shall detail as members thereof such members of the armedforces as, in his opinion, are best qualified for the  duty by reason of age, education,training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.”). 58 See United States v. Hilow, 32  M.J. 439, 440 (C.M.A. 1991) (prohibitingstacking of the pool of potential members of the court-martial) . 59 See James A. Young, Revising the Court Member Selection Process, 163MIL. L. REV. 91 (2000); Guy P. Glazier, He Called for His  Pipe, and Called forhis Bowl, and He Called for his Members Three-Selection of Military Juries by theSovereign: Impediment to Military Justice, 157 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998); Hodson,supra  note 25, at 53 . 60 In 1999, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on themethod of selection of members of the Armed Forces to serve on courts-martial. SeeNational Defense Authoization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 § 552, Pub. L. No. 106-65,113 Stat. 513 (Oct. 5, 1999). Congress required that the report examine alternatives,
*13 A second recurring criticism deals with the selection of courtmembers. At present, the convening authority selects the members eligibleto serve on courts-martial.57  Although judicial decisions forbid command-ers from using the power of selection to pack the court for the purpose ofobtaining a specific result, 58 a commander with a lack of integritypotentially could skew choices in favor of the prosecution. Some reformerswould like to see panel members selected randomly, much like jurorvenires in civilian criminal cases, in order to remove any temptation aconvening authority might have to pervert the military justice system. 59Congress and the JSC recently have been studying this issue.60 
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including random selection, to the current system of selection of members bycourts-martial by the convening authority. Congress specified that any alternativeconsidered be consistent with member selection criteria of 10 U.S.C. § 25(d)(2).The JSC studied the issue and concluded that the current practice best applies thecriteria of Article 25(d), UCM J, consistent with demands of fairness and justice inthe military justice system. See REPORT OF THE DOD JOINT SERVICECOMMITTEE ON THE METHOD OF SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THEARMED FORCES TO SERVE ON COURTS-MARTIAL, EXECUTIVESUMM ARY (August 1999) (on file at the Criminal Law Division of the ArmyOffice of The Judge Advocate General). 61 Colonel M ark Harvey, of the OTJAG-CLD , indicated the most frequentcriticism by the public of the military justice system relates to the unit commander’sdiscretionary decision to prefer charges and thereafter the general court-martialconvening authority’s decision to refer the charges to court-martial. Following trial,there is frequent criticism of the findings and sentence, and performance of thedefense counsel. Complaints usually originate from the accused, victim or fromtheir family members and friends. Criticism that the convening authority has toomany roles or too much power in the military justice system is extremely rare.Colonel Harvey could recall less than ten complaints that the convening authorityhad too much authority under the UCMJ. Harvey Interview, supra  note 20. See alsosupra  note 20 (describing the role of OTJAG , CLD  in responding to questions fromthe public). 62 See 10 U .S.C. §§ 822-824 (power to convene courts-martial). 63 See id. § 834 (referral of charges). 64 See id. § 860 (actions of the convening authority after trial). 65 See id. § 837 (prohibiting unlawful command influence). 66 See Spak & T omes, supra  note 56, at 512 (discussing the problems of thecommander’s strong influence); Hodson, supra  note 25, at 45 (proposing arequirement to limit prosecutorial discretion by requiring a judge advocate toreview a commander’s charges for legal sufficiency); Donald W . Hansen, JudicialFunctions for the Commander, 41 MIL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1968) (advocating a similarproposal). 
A third, often repeated, criticism deals with the influence commandershave over the military justice system. 61 Under current law, commanders*14determine whether to convene a court-martial62  and what charges to refer.63After trial, they also have the power to approve or disapprove guiltyverdicts and the power to remit punishments.64  In addition, althoughcommanders may not attempt to influence courts-martial,65  the realityremains that the accused, the court-members, the witnesses, and the trialcounsel usually fall within their commands. Many commentators,accordingly, believe that commanders should have less direct and indirectcontrol over military justice.66 
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67 See 10 U .S.C. §  836 (authorizing the President to promulgate rules ofevidence and procedures “which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with” theUCM J). See also supra note 61 (discussing the Report of the DOD Joint ServiceCommittee on the Method of Selection of Members of the Armed Forces to Serveon Courts-M artial). 68 See supra  note 39. 69 See supra  Part 1. 
If reformers want to address these kinds of criticisms, the question ariseswhether changing the MCM rule-making process would help to achievethem. Generalizations are difficult because critics may see differentsolutions. I am doubtful, however, that reforming the rule-making processwould have much effect on efforts to address these kinds of criticisms forthree reasons. First, the UCMJ limits the kinds of changes that the President may makethrough amendments to the MCM. Although the President has the power topromulgate rules of evidence and procedure, these rules may not contradictanything in the UCMJ, such as the panel member selection criteria inArticle 25(d).67  As a result, no matter what the MCM rule-making processlooks like, the President generally cannot effect radical changes to themilitary justice system. For example, the President could not amend theMCM to take away the commander’s discretion to decide which kinds ofcourts-martial to convene, which charges to refer to courts-martial, orwhich service members are eligible to serve as members of particularcourts-martial. *15 Second, even if the MCM rule-making process allowed moreexternal input, the President seems unlikely to use the process to makemajor reforms of the military justice system. In the past, the President hasreformatted the rules of evidence and procedure, but has not changed theoverall operation of the system. Instead, the President has left that kind oftask to Congress. For example, as noted above, Congress created militaryjudges in the Military Justice Act of 1968;68  the President did not attemptthis dramatic reform of the military justice system through executive order.Third, proposals for reforming the MCM rule-making process generallyinvolve adding more formalities. For instance, as noted above, CaptainBarry advocates creating new committees, imposing new publicationrequirements, delaying the effective date of changes, and so forth.69Experience from other fields suggests that adding formalities of these kinds
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70 See Todd D . Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes  ofAdministrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 162-65 (2000) (noting howmovements to less formal rule-making increase the number of rules made byadministrative agencies). 71 See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (granting the President power to promulgate the rules inthe MCM , so long as they do not conflict with the UCM J). 72 See id. 
generally impedes rule-making efforts.70  Indeed, the more significant andthe more controversial a desired amendment, the more likely someone willuse a formal procedure to block it. In sum, changes to the process of amending the MCM, no matter howreasonable, will not trigger radical change or facilitate any large-scalereforms of the military justice system. Rather, as noted in the previousdiscussion, they mostly will affect the manner in which the President makesadjustments to the rules of evidence and procedure, either to correct errorsand oversights, or to implement incremental legislative changes, or toconform the MCM to developments in the civilian courts. C. Separation of Powers Concerns The structure of the military justice system reflects a balance of powerbetween Congress and the President. At present, Congress controls thecontent of the UCMJ, while the President has authority over the MCM.71Imposing new restrictions or procedures on the rule-making process may*16 dilute the President’s power. Accordingly, any change to the MCMrule-making process necessarily affects the overall balance of power. Balances of power may shift from time to time within the boundariesestablished by the Constitution. Yet, caution dictates careful thought beforeweakening one political branch. In many instances, tampering with longestablished balances of powers may have far-reaching effects andunintended consequences. As one example, reducing the President’s powerover the MCM might cause him or his political subordinates to adjust themanner in which they exercise their discretion in dealing with militaryjustice issues. For instance, as noted below, the President may use greaterpolitical scrutiny when appointing judges to the Court of Appeals for theArmed Forces. One response to the observation that the military justice system reflectsa balance of power might be that the President derives his power topromulgate MCM provisions through UCMJ Article 36.72  If Congressdesired, it could eliminate this delegation. Using its power to “To make
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73 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 , cl. 14. 74 See id. art. 2, § 2 , cl. 1. 75 165  U.S. 553 (1897). 76 See id. at 558 (holding that “it is within the power of the president of theUnited States, as commander in chief, to validly convene a general court-martial”even without express statutory authorization). 77 See William F. Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate  Military Justice: ACritical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals,  34 N.Y.U.L. REV.861, 862-63 (1959) (“Unless restricted by express statute, the President has power,under the Constitution, to issue regulations defining offenses within the armedforces, prescribing punishments for them, constituting tribunals to try such offenses,and fixing the mode of procedure and methods of review of proceedings of suchtribunals.”). See also CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THECOMMANDER IN CHIEF 109 (1951) (reaching similar conclusions about thePresident’s inherent power to regulate d iscipline in the armed forces); EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POW ERS 316 (3d ed. 1948)(same). But see Ziegel W. Neff, Presidential Power to Regulate  Military Justice,30 JUDGE AD VOCAT E J. 6, 6-11 (1960) (arguing that the Constitution does notgrant the President plenary power over military justice). 78 See United States v. Ezell, 6 M.J. 307, 316-18 (C.M .A. 1979) (upholding aprovision in the 1969 MCM  allowing commanding officers to issue search warrants,even though the UCMJ at that time did not authorize the President to create rulesgoverning pretrial activities). 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,”73Congress could establish its own rules of evidence and procedure bystatute. Accordingly, the argument would be that the balance of power hasno great constitutional significance. This reasoning, although not necessarily incorrect, fails to take intoaccount the special role of the President in our system of government.Article II, section 2 makes the President the Commander in Chief.74  InUnited States v. Swaim,75  the Supreme Court held that this status gives thePresident at least some authority over courts-martial, even in the absenceof legislation from Congress.76  The precise implications of this holding*17 remain unclear, but some commentators have concluded that thePresident could have promulgated the rules in the MCM even without thegrant of authority from Article 36.77  The Court of Military Appeals,moreover, has upheld an MCM provision in at least one instance basedsolely on the President’s constitutional authority and not any statutory grantof power.78 Another response to worries about separation of powers might be thatthe President in reality exercises little power over the MCM. In most
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79 See MCM , supra  note 3, R.C.M. 1004(c) (listing aggravating factors, at leastof one of which is necessary for a sentence of death). 80 ABA Summary, supra  note 24, at 2. 
instances, the JSC prepares the changes and the President simply signs anexecutive order putting them into effect. As a result, the President and hispolitical subordinates probably would have little objection to changing therule-making process, even if the changes theoretically weakened executivepower. This response has much truth in it. Still, in a few instances, the Presidentor political members of the DOD may want specific amendments to dealwith politically charged topics. The list of aggravating factors such ascapital offenses (of which at least one must be found for a sentence ofdeath), may provide one example.79 A President with strong views oncapital punishment may wish to retain plenary power to alter the list. Ifrestrictions on the MCM rule-making process inhibit the President, then thePresident might react by using other powers to influence the military justicesystem. III. Assessment of Captain Barry’s Seven Proposals Captain Barry’s proposals appear modest and reasonable at first glance.The recommendations generally strive to make more information available,to expand the number of persons who can participate in the MCM revisionprocess, and to establish additional stages of review. The *18 support formost of the suggestions, from the ABA House of Delegates and from MajorGeneral Hodson, gives them weight. Yet, upon closer inspection, the benefits from adding new proceduresand formalities to the MCM amendment process turn out to be largelyillusory. The proposals at best would offer only marginal improvements tothe present procedure, while imposing additional burdens-sometimessubstantial burdens-on the system. For these reasons, Congress, thePresident, and the DOD should hesitate to adopt them without moreevidence that the benefits of change will outweigh the costs. A. The ABA’s Advisory Committee Proposal In 1997, as noted above, the ABA House of Delegates by formalresolution recommended creating “a broadly constituted advisory commit-tee, including public membership and including representatives of the bar,the judiciary, and legal scholars, to consider and recommend rules ofprocedure and evidence at courts-martial.” 80 The report accompanying this
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81 STANDING COMMITTEE ON ARMED FORCES LAW ET AL., REPORTTO THE HOUSE OF DELEGAT ES 5 (1997) (“First, the Committee recommendsa statute be enacted by Congress establishing a broadly constituted advisorycommittee, including public membership, to make recommendations concerningpresidential rulemaking affecting courts-martial and appeals, similar to committeesprescribed for other Federal courts.”). 82 See id. at 3, 11 . Federal law provides: “The Jud icial Conference mayauthorize the appointment of committees to assist the Conference by recommendingrules to be prescribed ... under this title. Each such committee shall consist ofmembers of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges.” 28U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (2000). 83 DOD DIRECTIVE NO. 5500.17 , supra  note 10, § E2.1. 84 Id. § E3.4.2 . 
recommendation explains that members of the bar would include militarytrial and defense counsel as well as civilian practitioners.81 Captain Barry and the report accompanying the ABA proposal providelittle substantive argument for this recommendation. On the contrary, theyjustify the recommendation solely by pointing out that the Federal JudicialConference has the benefit of a similar advisory committee to assist it indevising rules of evidence and procedure for the federal courts.82  Theywould like to see the same kind of assistance in the military context. *19 This proposal is neither radical nor dangerous. Its implementationwould not require dramatic effort. The JSC, or a similar body, couldcompile a list of names of potential advisors who would agree to serve onan advisory committee without pay. This advisory committee from time totime could offer suggestions for changes to rules of evidence and procedurein the MCM. Why then has the DOD declined to establish an advisory committee?One reason may be that little need exists for such a committee. Membersof the bench and bar, academics, and others already have the ability torecommend changes directly to the JSC. They do not have to act throughan advisory committee, although they certainly could create their ownprivate committees if they desired. Indeed, as Captain Barry indicates,SCAFL has periodically made recommendations to the JSC that werecarefully considered by the JSC. Department of Defense Directive 5500.17 requires the JSC to conductan annual review of the MCM, with an eye to finding neededamendments.83  The same directive explicitly provides: “It is DOD policyto encourage public participation in the JSC’s review of [the MCM].”84
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85 See JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, INTERNALORGANIZATION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE JOINTSERVICE COMMITTEE ON M ILITARY JUSTICE pt. III (March 2000)[hereinafter JSC OPERATING PROCEDURES]. 86 Eugene M ilhizer, Amending the Manual for Courts-Martial, ARMY LAW .,Apr. 1992, at 81 . 87 Id. 88 See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 19,409, 19,410 (1993) (soliciting comments onproposed changes to the MCM ). 89 Each JSC service representative evaluates proposals received within theservice and sponsors proposals, as appropriate to the JSC for consideration in thenext annual review cycle. See JSC OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra  note 86,pt. III. 90 See id. 
The JSC has implemented these requirements.85  As a result, any memberof the public or Armed Forces may communicate suggestions to the JSC forchanging rules of procedure or evidence. Members of the JSC’s working group, indeed, long have urged soldiersand civilians to participate in the amendment process. In 1992, workinggroup member Major Eugene Milhizer published an article explaining theprocess in The Army Lawyer. At the end of the article he proclaimed: Amending the Manual should be a cooperative process that incorporatesinput and ideas from a variety of interested sources. All persons concernedwith the quality of the military justice system are encouraged to submit tothe JSC their suggestions for amending the Manual.86 *20 After giving themailing address for sending comments, Major Milhizer concluded: “Takethe time to help improve military justice. It certainly is worth the effort.”87For the past seven years, the JSC has used similar notices published in theFederal Register to solicit comments and suggestions.88 Starting in 2000, moreover, the JSC service representatives have begunsending annual calls for proposals to the judiciary, trial, and defenseorganizations, and judge advocate general schools.89  The JSC willacknowledge all proposals received from individuals or organizationsoutside DOD, discuss the proposal, and notify the sender in writing whetherthe JSC voted to decline the proposal as not within the JSC’s cognizance,reject it, table it, or accept it.90  Although these organizations previouslyhave had the opportunity to make suggestions, these new procedures mayprovide them greater encouragement. 
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91 Exec. Order No. 13 ,140 ,64 Fed. Reg. 196, § 2(a)(Oct. 12, 1999). 92 5 U.S.C. app. 2  §§ 1-12. 93 See id. § 10 (requiring meetings open to the public, detailed minutes, andpublic inspection of documents). 94 See id. § 2(b)(1) (“[N]ew advisory committees should be established onlywhen they are determined to be essential and their number should be kept to theminimum necessary.”). 95 See Michelle Nuszkiewicz, Note, Twenty  Years  of the Federal AdvisoryCommittee Act:  Its Time for Some Changes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 957, 961 (1992)(arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 208 bars advisory committees from participating inmatters in which they or their firms have a financial interest). The Federal AdvisoryCommittee Act itself mandates that advisory committees not “be inappropriatelyinfluenced ... by any special interest.” 5 U.S.C. app. 2  § 5(b)(2). 
The process of implementing the new psychotherapist-patient privilegeinto Military Rule of Evidence 513 provides an excellent example of publicparticipation under the current system of military rule-making and theimpact it may have. The initial draft of Military Rule of Evidence 513developed by the JSC and published in the Federal Register did not include“clinical social worker” within the definition of “psychotherapist.” Thisdraft received a large volume of oral and written public comment, includingsuggestions from the American Psychiatric Association, and the AmericanPsychology Association. At the public hearing, the JSC heard persuasivetestimony about the extensive and important role of clinical social workersin psychotherapy. As a result of this informed public comment from expertsin the field, the JSC modified the definition of “psychotherapist” to include“clinical social workers.”91 *21 Captain Barry himself briefly alludes to another reason that JSC hasnot sought to create an advisory committee. In particular, the proposedadvisory committee almost certainly would come within the coverage of theFederal Advisory Committee Act.92  This Act imposes nontrivial recordkeeping and other requirements on advisory committees.93  It also expresslydiscourages the creation of unnecessary committees.94 Although the JSC undoubtedly could insure compliance with the Act,the effort does not seem worthwhile. As noted previously, interestedmembers of the bench and bar already have ample means to advanceproposals for changing the MCM. Creating an advisory committee,ironically, probably would not make more input possible. On the contrary,it might reduce the input because federal advisory committee members mayfall within the scope of federal conflict of interest laws.95  As a result,defense attorneys who serve on the committee might not be able to
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96 See Barry, supra  note 2, at 246 (quoting 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN &FRED RIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE P 1-54.00, at 30n.148 (2d ed. 1999)). 97 ABA Summary, supra  note 24, at 2. 98 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemak-ing, Democratic  Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999);Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rule Making, 22 TEX. TECH.L. REV. 323 , 324 (1991); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theoryand Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989). 99 28 U .S.C. §  2072(a) (2000). 
participate in decisions that would benefit their clients. This sacrifice seemstoo great; some of the most likely advisory committee members-likeCaptain Barry-have active legal practices with many clients. Finally, Captain Barry notes that changes to the MCM are political.96Although he is quite correct, creating an advisory committee would notensure more democratic results than those achieved under the presentsystem. Members of advisory committees are no more politically account-able than the JSC. If the problem is that certain proposals to change themilitary justice system are likely to raise substantial political controversy,then Congress or the President ought to play the lead role in making them.Unlike advisory committees, they are subject to democratic pressures. *22 B. The ABA’s Rule-making Procedure Proposal The ABA, as noted above, also wants to see “a method of adopting rulesof procedure and evidence at courts-martial which is generally consistentwith court rule-making procedure in Federal civilian courts.” 97 Evaluatingthis proposal first requires an understanding of the rule-making procedurein the federal civilian courts. It then calls for an assessment of the benefitsand costs that the proposal would produce. 1. Overview of Federal Civilian Rule-Making Procedure Various authors have described the rule-making procedure in the federalcivilian courts.98  By statute, Congress has given the Supreme Court thepower to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure for the federalcourts.”99  These rules include the Federal Rules of Criminal Proceduresand Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern federal civilian criminalproceedings and serve the same purpose as the Rules for Courts-Martialand the Military Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court does not draft procedural and evidentiary rulesitself. Instead, the Court relies on the recommendations of a body called the
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100 See Baker, supra  note 99, at 328. 101 See id. 102 See id. 103 Id. at 329. 104 See id. 105 See id. 106 See id. 107 See 28 U .S.C. §  2073(b) (2000). 108 See Baker, supra  note 99, at 329. 109 See id. 110 See id. 111 See id. 112 See 28 U .S.C. §  2074(a). 113 See id. 
“Judicial Conference of the United States.”100  The Chief Justice of theUnited States chairs the Judicial Conference.101  Its other members includethe chief judges of the United States Courts of Appeals, twelve districtcourt judges, and the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade.102 The Judicial Conference relies heavily on an important committeeknown as the “Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.”103The Judicial Conference also receives assistance from various advisorycommittees, including an Advisory Committee on Criminal *23 Rules.104The membership of the advisory committees includes state and federaljudges, practicing lawyers, and law professors.105  The Chief Justiceappoints the members of all the committees.106 Each advisory committee has a continuing obligation to study the ruleswithin its field.107  It may consider suggestions for revisions from anysource, and may generate its own proposals.108  Proposals approved by theadvisory committee undergo review first by the Standing Committee.109  Ifthe Standing Committee approves them, the Judicial Conference reviewsthem next.110  The Judicial Conference then may forward them to theSupreme Court.111 The Supreme Court generally approves the recommendations of theJudicial Conference. It then must forward the proposals to Congress duringa regular session, but prior to the start of May.112  To give Congress theopportunity for review, the rules do not become effective untilDecember.113  During the interim, Congress may pass legislation disapprov-
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114 See id. 115 For example, Congress went against the recommendations of the AdvisoryCommittee when it adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415. Congressoriginally bypassed the normal rule-making process and passed these threeevidentiary rules subject to reconsideration upon objection by the JudicialConference. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules met and consideredeighty-four written comments, overwhelmingly opposing the new rules. The JudicialConference objected and proposed, in the alternative, that Federal Rules ofEvidence 404 and 405 be amended to correct ambiguities and constitutionalinfirmities in Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and  415 . At the time, theStanding Committees were composed of over forty judges, practicing lawyers, andacademics. Everyone, except the Department of Justice, opposed proposed FederalRules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415. In spite of overwhelming opposition byfederal rule makers, Congress declined to reconsider its original passage of FederalRules of Evidence 413, 414, and  415  and these rules became law in 1995. See FED.CRIM. CODE & RULES 256-58 (2000); SALTZBURG, supra  note 41, at 673-74.
ing them.114  Congress also can bypass the Federal Civilian Rule-makingprocedure in whole or in part.115 *24 2. Benefits of Adopting the Civilian Rule-Making Process Neither Captain Barry nor the ABA explain fully how they envision thecivilian rule-making procedures working in the military context. One likelypossibility would involve a military judicial conference composed ofmilitary judges and headed by the JSC. The military judicial conferencewould make proposals after receiving recommendations from advisorycommittees. The President would promulgate changes to the MCM onlyafter the advisory committees, the military judicial conference, and the JSCall had approved them. This approach probably would not require new legislation. ThePresident has the power to create advisory committees and could directmilitary judges to serve as part of a judicial conference. (By contrast, asdiscussed below, Major General Hodson’s proposal to involve members ofthe Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces would require action byCongress.) The President could further exercise discretion not to issueamendments unless they had obtained full approval. The more important issue is whether a new rule-making process of thissort would provide any substantial benefit. Captain Barry and the ABA,unfortunately, do not explain in any detail how their proposal wouldimprove the current rule-making process. On the contrary, as mentionedpreviously, the ABA’s report for the most part simply notes that the federalcourts use a different system. Presumably, they believe that the formal
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116 See Baker, supra  note 99, at 335. 117 See id. 118 See Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: TheRole of Economic Analysis , 23 J . LEG AL STU D. 569, 575-82 (1994). 119 Consider, for analogy, the famous “Emperor of China” fallacy. If you askedeveryone in China how tall the emperor is, would their average answer tell you hisactual height to the ten thousandth or ten millionth of an inch? Obviously not, unlesseveryone you asked had some basis for knowing the true height, and was not merelyguessing. 
participation of large numbers of experienced personnel, and the multiplestages of review, would provide better proposals for changes to the MCM.Their view that a judicial conference would enhance the process mightprove true, if tested, but I see substantial reason for some skepticism. Inparticular, Captain Barry and the ABA fail to note that a wide range ofcommentators recently have criticized the federal civilian court rule-makingprocess. Although no one has called for scrapping the process altogether,their valid objections do raise doubts about the benefits of importingsimilar formalities into the MCM amendment process. Professor Thomas Baker, who has served on an advisory committee forcivil procedure, has advanced perhaps the leading criticism of the civiliancourt rule-making process. He has observed that most of the participants inthe process make their decisions based simply on anecdotal evidence andsubjective normative judgments.116  Although the judges, practitioners, andacademics who serve on the various committees have *25 extensivepractical experience, they generally have no empirical or scientific basis forassessing the merits of proposed amendments.117  Other observers also haveadvanced this criticism.118 The JSC, at present, undeniably has the same problem when it evaluatesproposals for changing the MCM. It often must make determinations basedon informed intuition rather than on any kind of objective data. Butinvolving more experts in the process will not necessarily make thisproblem go away. Advisory panels and multiple layers of review will addmore opinions, but they may not provide any better information than theJSC already can obtain through its study of the military justice system andby receiving public comment.119 Another problem with the civilian rule-making process is that it invitesthe meddling of special interest groups. Professor Linda S. Mullenix, wholike Professor Baker also has served on the civil procedure advisorycommittee, has documented how the process has become increasingly
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120 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory InformalDiscovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N .C.L. REV. 795 (1991). 121 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules Dispose of ManifestlyUnfounded  Assertions:  An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-transubstantive Rules ofCivil Procedure , 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2075 (1989) (describing lobbyingefforts); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.. 1,17-18 (1985) (same). 122 Mullenix, supra  note 121, at 836-37. 123 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (noting the differences between themilitary community and the civilian community, and between military law andcivilian law and concluding that the UCMJ cannot be equated to a civilian criminalcode). 124 For example, in March 2000, the Army Defense Appellate Divisionsubmitted nine proposals for change to the  Army JSC service representative. SeeNational Institute  of Military Justice, 76 MILITARY JUSTICE GAZET TE 2 (Apr.2000). 
politicized.120  Because procedural rules often will affect some personsmore than others, the most concerned individuals inevitably have a strongdesire to seek favorable treatment, regardless of the consequences to others.Various other scholars have made similar observations.121 *26 Professor Mullenix laments that advisory committees really have nogood option for addressing this form of politicization. She states: The Advisory Committee’s dilemma, then, is this: On the one hand, itcan ... shunt all potentially controversial rule reforms to Congress. If thishappens, the Advisory Committee will become an ineffective third branchinstitution. On the other hand, the Advisory Committee can embrace thenew openness, [and] meet interest group demands ....122 T h e  s e c o n dchoice, obviously, does not help the system because it produces results thatfavor the most vocal advocates over all others, regardless of the merits oftheir positions. This problem is particular troubling when the resultsconcern maintenance of good order and discipline in the military, becausethis important objective often has no particular spokesperson. 123 True, under current procedures, special interest groups already mightattempt to influence the JSC. Defense counsel, for example, can submitcomments and proposals to the JSC advocating positions that specificallywould aid their clients.124  They also can participate at public meetings.They further can write law review articles or newspaper editorials. This type of input by special interests, however, differs in an importantrespect from the kind that Professor Mullenix discusses. Under currentrules, private parties have no formal role in the amendment procedure.
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125 See Exec. Order No. 13 , 140, 64 Fed. Reg. 55 ,115  (Oct. 6, 1999). 126 See id. 127 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1996) (holding that Federal Ruleof Evidence 501 requires federal courts to recognize a psychotherapist-patientprivilege). 128 See John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, VirtualConfrontation, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.. 191,214-15 (1999) (discussing this trend and  the constitutional implications). 129 See Mark Owens K asanin, Amending Rule 9(h):  An Example of How  theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure  Get Changed, 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 417(1996) (providing an interesting narrative account of a minor amendment to a ruleaffecting admiralty cases). 
They can make suggestions, but they cannot vote on proposals. The JSCthus does not have to confront the dilemma described by ProfessorMullenix. In addition, to a large extent, the civilian rule-making process serves adifferent function from the current MCM rule-making procedures. Whenthe federal courts amend their rules, they usually are breaking new ground.They are creating novel evidentiary standards or they are implementingprocedural innovations. These kinds of changes in theory might benefit *27from the prolonged deliberation that the civilian rule-making proceduresfoster. The JSC does important work, but realistically it plays a less innovativerole than the Judicial Conference. The JSC usually follows changes thatalready have occurred in civilian rules of evidence and procedure. The1999 amendments to the MCM provide a good example.125  In thoseamendments, as discussed above, the President created a psychothera-pist-patient evidentiary privilege and also certain special rules for childwitnesses in sexual abuse cases.126  These amendments, while significant,did not require the JSC to engage in original thinking. The federal civiliancourts have recognized a psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege since1996,127  and state courts have had special procedures for child testimonyfor many years. 128 Thus, the public commentary and other complicatedprocedures used by the federal courts for rule-making infiltrate through theJSC into the MCM. Finally, the civilian rule-making procedure tends to take a long time. 129The process, as described above, involves multiple layers of approval andreview. In many instances, minor, uncontroversial, but important changesmay take several years to go into effect. By contrast, the JSC annual reviewsystem results in a systemic review of the MCM within each year. Indeed,
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its annual review contemplates that it generally will solve all problems thatarise. The civilian rule-making process has produced a workable and notoverly controversial set of rules for the federal courts. The MCM rule-mak-ing procedure, however, has achieved the same result for military courts.In deciding whether the military should adopt the civilian process, thequestion boils down to whether the benefits outweigh the burdens. In viewof the difficulty of stating the benefits of replicating the civilian pro-cess,*28 and the apparent problems replicating it would introduce, aconvincing case has not been made. C. The ABA’s Congressional Oversight Proposal In addition to its two other recommendations, the ABA also has askedfor “requirements for reporting to Congress [and] a waiting period for rulesof procedure and evidence at courts-martial.”130  The federal civilian courtrule-making procedure, as noted above, incorporates these features.131  Itrequires the Supreme Court to transmit proposed changes to Congress andaffords Congress at least seven months to intervene before new rules gointo effect. The pertinent statute governing federal civilian court rule-making says:The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to becomeeffective a copy of the proposed rule. Such a rule shall take effect no earlierthan December 1 of the Year in which such rule is so transmitted unlessotherwise provided by law.132 Two points about this provision requirespecific mention. First, the statute does not require Congress to take anyaction. If Congress does nothing, the new rules become effective. Second,to block proposed changes, Congress must pass an actual law. Both housesmust approve a bill and present it to the President for signature or veto. Imposing a similar waiting period for amendments to the MCMrule-making procedures would not work a fundamental change in the JSC’scurrent procedures. At present, as noted above, the JSC waits seventy-fivedays after announcing changes to the MCM before transmitting them to thePresident.133  Without great difficulty, the JSC could extend the delay to
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*29 seven months to give Congress the same amount of time that it has toreview changes in the civilian rules. Still, I doubt that Congress actually would take advantage of anextended period of delay to block proposed MCM changes. In general,Congress has deferred to the military in determining the procedural andevidentiary needs of military justice system. To my knowledge, it has neverattempted to overrule any MCM provisions by statute. Indeed, it often hasamended the UCMJ to comport with the DOD on policy recommendations.Thus, the proposal would do little more than prolong the MCM rule-makingprocess. In addition, recent experience from federal civilian court rule-makingprocedure suggests that a required delay before rules become effective maygive more power to special interest groups who want to defeat proposedchanges. For example, several years ago, the Supreme Court transmitted toCongress a new civil procedure rule requiring litigants to make certaindisclosures in discovery.134  Lobbyists nearly killed the measure inCongress.135 D. General Hodson’s Military Judicial Conference Proposal More than twenty-five years ago, Major General Hodson urged that “aMilitary Judicial Conference, headed by the Chief Judge of the Court ofMilitary Appeals [now the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces], beestablished and given power to prescribe rules of procedure andevidence.”136  This proposal for altering the MCM rule-making procedureresembles the ABA’s second recommendation, but with a major difference.It would take authority away from the JSC and President, and vest it in thecivilian judges on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The previous discussion has highlighted some of the reasons to doubtthat the judicial conference model of rule-making greatly would improvethe present work of the JSC. Major General Hodson’s proposal, though,*30 would have a further potentially harmful effect. In particular, it wouldtend to upset the balance of power between Congress and the President. 
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To put Major General Hosdon’s proposal into effect, Congress wouldhave to amend UCMJ Article 36. 137 The amendment would have to say thatthe President could not alter the rules of evidence and procedure exceptupon the Court of Appeals for the Armed Force’s recommendation.Otherwise, the President simply could ignore the Court of Appeals for theArmed Forces in the rule-making process.138 This amendment to Article 36 would raise possible constitutionalquestions. The UCMJ prevents the President from discharging members ofCourt of Appeals for the Armed Forces for any reason other than neglectof duty, misconduct, or mental or physical disability.139  In general,Congress may not impose restrictions on the President’s ability to dischargeindividuals who exercise executive functions, if the restrictions would“unduly trammel on executive authority.”140 The President would have a substantial argument that deciding the kindsof rules that courts-martial should have is an executive function. ThePresident has created rules for courts-martial for half a century under theUCMJ and did the same earlier under the Articles of War. Indeed, thePresident even has established rules in the absence of legislation under hispowers as Commander-in-Chief.141  Because a duty to act only with theCourt of Appeals for the Armed Force’s approval would trammel on thisimportant function, the only question is whether the effect is excessive. In any case, even if the provision would not violate the Constitution, itwould alter the current balance of power between Congress and thePresident. The measure clearly would weaken the President’s role in theprocess. Congress would retain complete control over the content of the*31 UCMJ, while the President would lose the power to change the MCMwithout approval from others. The President might overlook this shift in power. Just as easily,however, the proposal might have far reaching consequences. For example,the President’s selection of judges for the Court of Appeals for the Armed
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES 31
142 Barry, supra  note 2 , at 275 . 143 Id. (emphasis in original). 
Forces might become more political. Similarly, the President might putgreater pressure on the service secretaries to oversee criminal justice issues.Again, the question is whether the potential benefit outweighs the possiblecost. E. Captain Barry’s Public Availability Proposal Captain Barry, as noted above, does not merely advocate adopting theproposals of the ABA and of Major General Hodson. On the contrary, healso advances three significant additional recommendations of his own. Hefirst urges creating an enforceable “mechanism to make available to thepublic the contents [of] and justifications for ... proposals ... generatedwithin DOD.”142  Captain Barry states: “An open process that would allowfor access not only to all proposals-but to their justifications and explana-tions as well-would clearly be a huge improvement.”143 This recommendation requires some background information toevaluate. At present, although anyone may suggest MCM changes to theJSC, traditionally most proposals do not come from the general public.Instead, they originate from within the DOD. Either service members makethem, or they come down from the DOD leadership. The origin within the DOD of the majority of proposals should not comeas a surprise. Judge advocates have the most involvement in the militaryjustice system. They also tend to understand the proper channels throughwhich to make recommendations for amending the MCM. Despite thenewly instituted annual call to the public for suggestions, judge advocatesprobably will continue to have a dominant role in the process. Although Captain Barry does not state this point explicitly, he may beassuming-and, if so, correctly-that the DOD could implement a requirementthat any DOD personnel who make recommendations provide written*32justifications for them. The DOD then could require the JSC to publishthese proposals and their justifications in the Federal Register. The JSCthen would have to disclose and explain any action taken on the proposals.This recommendation, like all of Captain Barry’s suggestions, appearsreasonable enough. The JSC could follow his suggestion without having togive up any aspect of its current practices. Again, the only question iswhether the benefit justifies the burden. 
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES32
144 5 U.S.C. §  553(c) (2000). 145 See Todd D . Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes  ofAdministrative Regulation, 52 ADM IN. L. REV. 159, 165 (2000). 
The public might benefit from disclosure of the JSC’s reasons forrejecting proposals. Civilian defense counsel, for instance, may wish tocriticize what they consider insufficient reasons for rejecting proposals thatmight benefit their clients. In addition, a public record of what the JSC hasand has not considered would assist anyone thinking about submittingfuture changes. The burden of the proposal, in some ways, does not seem very great.Most DOD personnel who make proposals already are providing writtenjustifications for their adoption. When the JSC decides to make changes,moreover, it usually writes an analysis or discussion section explainingtheir purpose and effect. Accordingly, Captain Barry’s proposal wouldimpose a significant new burden only in requiring to the JSC to explain itsreasons for declining to adopt proposals generated within the DOD. The JSC, however, has understandable reasons for wishing to avoid theprocess of justifying its decisions not to adopt proposals. Unless they aresuperficial and unhelpful (for example, “The proposed changes areunwarranted.”), providing explanations may take a great deal of work. If theJSC rejected a large number of proposals, it might have to increase thenumber of personnel assigned to its working group or ask the currentmembers to neglect their other duties so that they could write reasons forrejecting the proposals. Efficiency of operation is of particular concern asthe military services have been downsized. Experience in other areas also indicates that the task of providingwritten justifications in formal rule-making procedures can becomeincreasingly burdensome. The Administrative Procedure Act, for example,requires agencies to provide a “concise general statement” of its rationalefor rules.144  Many agencies have found that if they provide only a shortstatement, they open themselves up to criticism. Accordingly, they try toprovide as comprehensive justifications as possible. Professor Todd *33Rakoff has observed: “Statements of Justification that used to be a fewparagraphs or pages now run to tens of pages, each three columns wide.”145 From the JSC’s perspective, moreover, providing reasons for eachaction not taken might cause unnecessary and harmful embarrassment. Forexample, suppose a judge on the Army Court of Criminal Appealsrecommends changes to the MCM and the JSC decides not to implement
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them. The JSC certainly would not relish the task of calling public attentionto what it considers the flaws in the judge’s ideas. Fear of public criticism,moreover, might dissuade others from recommending changes. In sum, the issue has two sides, and no clear answer. Here, the stakes donot seem very large. Although the JSC probably should decline to act, itcould attempt to follow Captain Barry’s suggestion on a trial basis. If theburden proves excessive, then it could rethink the issue. F. Captain Barry’s Minutes Proposal Captain Barry also has recommended that the JSC make available to thepublic the minutes of its meetings and the minutes of its working group. 146I have seen the minutes of a few meetings, and they generally contain onlyminimal information about its decisions. Because the JSC and its workinggroup diligently keep these records, the proposal would impose little or noburden on them. The JSC, indeed, already publishes the analysis toproposed changes in the Federal Register. On the other hand, confidentiality often serves important purposes. Forexample, Congress exempted deliberative process material from disclosureunder the Freedom of Information Act for three policy reasons: first, toencourage, open, frank discussions on matters of policy between subordi-nates and superiors; second to protect against premature disclosure ofproposed policies before they are finally adopted; and third, to protectagainst public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons andrationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for agency action.147*34 Releasing the JSC minutes potentially could harm all of these interestsand particularly the third. G. Captain Barry’s JSC Proposal Captain Barry finally complains that the JSC’s membership at presentdoes not extend beyond the “five officers chiefly responsible for theadministration of military justice in the five services.” Although he doesnot spell out exactly whom he would like to see included, he does note thatthe ABA’s Standing Committee on Armed Forces Law previously hasurged the expansion of the JSC to “include public members.”148 
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This proposal raises some of the same considerations as the earlierproposal to create a broadly-constituted advisory board.149  To the extentthat the additional members would serve only to provide advice and makeproposals, questions of need again arise. Given that any member of thepublic already can suggest changes to the MCM, adding more members tothe JSC solely for that purpose would not accomplish much. The new members, however, probably would want to do more than justmake suggestions. They also would want to vote for or against proposalsfor changing the MCM. Voting power would raise questions about how theJSC could avoid the distorting effects of special interests. The FederalAdvisory Committee Act and conflict of interest rules also may poseproblems. At present, some bias may exist within the JSC, but its extent should notbe exaggerated. As Captain Barry rightly notes, the five members of theJSC have primary responsibility for administration of military justice intheir services. This responsibility does not mean that they represent onlythe interest of the prosecutors. On the contrary, they represent the needs ofthe entire system. In fact, JSC members normally have had experienceeither as defense counsel or trial judges, or both. Sometimes the JSC takes positions that favor the government. At othertimes, however, the JSC approves measures favorable to the accused. Forexample, as noted earlier, last year the JSC approved new MCM provisionscreating a psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege.150  This *35provision aids the accused, who may have made incriminating statementsto psychiatrists or social workers. Another example of an amendment thatfavors the accused is the 1998 amendment to Rule for Court-Martial 916(j)that provides a mistake of fact defense to a prosecution for carnal knowl-edge when the accused believed that the victim was at least sixteen yearsold at the time of the sexual intercourse.151
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES 35By contrast, if members of the public were to serve on the JSC, theymight have difficulty subordinating any professional interests that maydiffer from the general needs of the military justice system. Defensecounsel, for instance, naturally and justifiably would seek rules that tend toaid their clients, while voting against amendments favorable to theprosecution. This type of bias could have a distorting effect on the MCM.Perhaps to some extent, the JSC could cancel out potential bias byincluding members with opposing interests. For example, although logisticsmight prove difficult, the JSC conceivably could include trial counsel orcommanders to weigh against the views of defense counsel. In the end,however, the question remains whether it makes sense to disturb the JSC’sformally neutral composition. I am skeptical of the need in view of theJSC’s own experience and its willingness to obtain outside views. V. Conclusion The JSC has made significant progress in opening up the process ofamending the MCM. Much of credit for this development must go toSCAFL and other organizations in which Captain Barry has served withdistinction. Although Captain Barry modestly declines to identify hispersonal contribution, he undoubtedly played a key role, and deservesample credit. The question now arises whether the JSC or DOD might take furthersteps to change the MCM rule-making process. Captain Barry believes *36that they can and should, and his views deserve careful consideration.Nonetheless, the case for the changes that he requests is difficult to make.The seven proposals discussed in Captain Barry’s article would addmore formalities to the MCM amendment process. The JSC would have toseek input or perhaps even approval from advisory committees. It wouldhave to adhere to new waiting periods and publication requirements. It alsomight have to explain more publicly its reasons for certain actions orinactions. The JSC and DOD in short order could implement most of theseformalities. The changes, however, probably would not do much good.They would not bring fundamental reforms to the MCM. Indeed, they mightnot change much of anything. At worst, they would risk upsetting thepresent balance of power that has evolved between Congress and thePresident. For these reasons, this response has recommended hesitation inembracing the seven proposals that Captain Barry has recommended.Perhaps the JSC will want to experiment with some of them, such as
CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ABOUT FORMALITIES36making more records available to the public or maybe giving reasons forrejecting proposed amendments to the MCM. Before doing so, however, italso must consider what else it has on its list of priorities for improving themilitary justice system.
